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I.

THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATION
A.

The Character of Water Rights.

Water rights are an unusual form of property right.
They do not arise from and are not defined in patents or
instruments of grant;

they rather arise by claim, by seizure

and by application of water to beneficial use.

They are

transferable as interests in real property but have no tang
ible physical properties.

They are only components of an

ever-changing and interrelated regimen of precipitation, flow,
storage, diversion, consumption and return flows.

Their

existence and value is wholly dependent upon (i) their
recognition by custom and state law,

(i i ) the ability of the

claimant to divert water from the source of supply in priority
without interference by others, and (iii) the ability of the
claimant to prohibit diversions by others at times and in
amounts that impair delivery of water to the point of
diversion.
To the extent that the right is recognized by state
law, it is clear that the individual has a legal right to
protect his interest but, as a practical matter, cannot do so
physically and economically without cooperative action.
Unlike more traditional forms of property, a water right can-

not be protected by building a fence or placing it in a
safe.

The usufructuary nature of the right necessarily

exposes all water rights to dimunition by the wrongful acts of
others.

This potential for injury can only be prevented by

the constant supervision or administration of every water
right in a given basin.

Accordingly,

the proper administra

tion of all water rights lies at the core of each property
right.

With it, the right has value and utility; without it,

water is no more than ferae naturae, subject to capture by
force or stream location.
B.

The Role of the S t a t e .

The state's responsibility for administration of
water rights is frequently misconceived.

It does not rest on

a passive role as proprietor and grantor with ministerial
functions to allocate and deliver water pursuant to rights
created by state action.

Rather,

it stems from the state's

role as sovereign and rests on a duty to administer the
resource similar to the fiduciary responsibility of a trustee.
The waters of the western United States were owned
initially by the federal government by cession from foreign
powers.

By the Act of 1866,1/ Congress authorized the

transfer of rights to individuals to the extent they are
recognized by local custom and state law.

1/

30 U.S.C. § 5; 43 U.S.C. § 661
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In Article XVI,

Section 5 of its constitution,2/ Colorado declared that all of
the waters of natural streams are the property of the public
and dedicated to public use.

By such declaration with respect

to waters in which it had no proprietary interest, the state
assumed a trusteeship role to administer the waters of the
state for the benefit of the public.3/

As such, it became

responsible not only for minimal administrative functions but
also for administration of the kind a trustee owes to the
beneficiary of the trust.

Its responsibilities include, first

and foremost, the conservation of the estate and avoidance of
waste; second, the promotion of beneficial use by assisting
the appropriator in achieving use objectives to the maximum
extent feasible; third, the representation of beneficiaries in
a parens patriae capacity and maintaining the use regimen on
the river system; and fourth, the promotion of efficiency and
prudence of the kind expected of a trustee.

2/

Colo. Const., Art. XVI, Section 5 states that:
Water of streams public property.
The
water of every natural stream, not
heretofore appropriated, within the state
of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the
property of the public, and the same is
dedicated to the use of the people of the
state, subject to appropriation as
hereinafter provided.

3/ But see People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025
(1979), where the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument
that public access to waters flowing in nonnavigable streams
was justified by the fact that the state serves as a trustee
of these waters.
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C.

Criteria for Judging Administrative
Responsibility.

If water is administered in a ministerial capacity
only, it is susceptible to use, particularly in agricultural
and grazing basins, with little regard for conservation and
maximization of benefits.

If administration is viewed,

however, as a fiduciary responsibility, the role of the state
is not limited to the determination of priorities and
allocation of water pursuant to such priorities, but further
includes:

(i) the obligation to undertake a continuous study

of hydrological conditions throughout the basin or aquifer and
the development of a databank for use in the administration
and adjudication of water rights;

(ii) a responsibility for

objectively assessing proposed changes in use to determine
whether other rights would be adversely affected;
(iii) assisting water users seeking changes in points of
diversion or place of use to structure a program to achieve
the desired change without impairment of the common source of
supply;

(iv) taking action on behalf of user beneficiaries

generally to require terms and conditions for protection of
the regimen of flow and use; and (v) making technicallyqualified hearing officers responsible for initial determina
tions with respect to issues which involve matters of tech
nical expertise.

The performance of these duties would be

aided considerably by the development of an official state
policy on the relevant water rights issues.
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Consider whether Colorado's administration of water
rights meets this standard.

Is its system of administration a

product of historic accident, addressing only ministerial
functions and leaving to the user the responsibility, high
cost and inefficiency of protecting rights in a common source
of supply?
II.

COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE.
A.

Historic Patterns.

Prior to 1969, state administration of water rights
was limited to the enforcement of court decrees.

These

decrees were entered in proceedings resembling an action for a
declaratory judgment which determined that water had been
diverted from the source of supply and applied to beneficial
use.4/

The decrees also recognized, as a benchmark for

priority purposes, the date the intent to appropriate was
first manifested on the ground.5/

The State Engineer was

responsible for the administration of the decrees, which was
achieved through water commissioners in each of 70 water
districts.

The water commissioners had authority to

administer calls on the basis of priority lists, to check

4/

See C.R.S. 1963 § 148-9-1 et seq.

5/ See, e.g., Elk Rifle Water Company v. Templeton, 173 Colo.
438, 484 P .2d 1211 (1971).
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headgates and to maintain records of diversions.6/

Other

functions performed by the office of the State Engineer were
only collateral to water administration, e .g ., approving
reservoir design for safety,7/ metering temporary exchanges 8/
and rating flumes and weirs.9/
Adjudications generally were personal to the appropriator; they were a vehicle for him to fix the date and
quantity of his water right and locate the point of diver
sion.

Change proceedings occurred only for alterations in the

point of diversion,

i .e ., for modification of the decree, and

rarely drew opposition from other water right owners.

No

proceedings were prescribed by law or were in fact required
for changing the place and character of use or increasing the
consumptive use of water.

Under this system, expanded uses

which were undetected by the state or other water users were
transformed by the magic of time into "historic uses."

Not

until 1943 was there any formal procedure for such changes or
was provision made for securing jurisdiction over all poten
tial claimants to water from the common source by publication

6/

See C.R.S. 1963 § 148-15-1 et seq.

7/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-87-105.

8/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-83-101 et seq.

9/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-84-114.
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of notice rather than personal service upon the water
users.10/
No provision was made in the 1943 Act to bring the
State Engineer into the adjudication process; it left him only
with the minimal data collection powers granted to him in the
initial legislation of 1889.11/

The Act applied only to

waters of natural streams and did not encompass wells hydrau
lically connected to streams or nontributary aquifers.
Adjudications continued to be held on each stream system, some
extending over many years.

Both statute and case law provided

that no rights adjudicated in a supplemental proceeding could
predate the junior priority in a prior proceeding,12/ which
allowed users with previously adjudicated rights to ignore
subsequent proceedings unless or until a change occurred in
the source of supply.

This system worked relatively well when

changes of existing water rights were infrequent; the priority
doctrine automatically assured owners of senior rights that
they would not be adversely affected by new water rights.

If,

however, an application to change an existing decree could or
would affect an appropriator's source of supply, he had the
responsibility of going to court in a private proceeding.

10/

C.R.S. 1953 § 147-9-5.

11/

C.R.S. 1953 § 147-11-1 et seq.

It

12/ C.R.S. 1953 § 147-9-13; Hardesty Reservoir, Canal and
Land Company v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet and Irrigated Land
Company, 85 Colo. 555, 277 P 763 (1929); The United States of
America v. The District Court in and for the County of Eagle,
169 Colo. 555, 458 P.2d 760 (1969).
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should be noted that there was relatively little need for an
efficient mechanism for reviewing and approving changes of
water rights because such changes were relatively infrequent
and simple when compared to those of today.
This judicial method of determination and enforcement
of rights has become unique.

Only Montana and Idaho had

similar systems ,13/ where waters were plentiful and regulation
unnecessary.

Both states later rejected such procedures when

increased demands on the resource created the need for effec
tive administration.
procedure;

Today Colorado stands alone with such a

it arose by accident, not by planning, and has not

been reviewed and revised when the regimen of use has changed
from plenty to scarcity, and the focus has shifted from the
acquisition of new rights to the change and management of
existing water rights.
B.

Inadequacies First Noted.

Three developments in the 1950s and 1960s exposed the
inadequacies of the existing system.

The first development

was a recognition that substantial quantities of undeveloped
water lay in deep nontributary aquifers which could be mined
over limited time periods.

The use of this resource presented

issues that were not addressed by existing law and not resolv
able by reference to traditional priority concepts.

Moreover,

the physical location and nature of this water required sub-

13/

R.C.M. 1947 §§ 89-829, 89-836 (Repl. V o l . 6, part 1].
Idaho
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stantial hydrological data to quantify the amount of water
available in the aquifer and determine the effects of develop
ment and the impact of administration.
Second, with the coming of rural electric power, a
plethora of wells were dug in the alluvial aquifers.

They

were not initially perceived to have a direct impact on river
flows.

They were not subject to adjudication or to priority

administration under existing legislation. As a result of this
lack of regulation, an entire economy developed on the basis
of well water supply before the impact of these wells on
stream flows was identified.

These unadministered tributary

wells threatened the very fabric of the constitutionally
mandated doctrine of prior appropriation.

The wells were

diverting and consumptively using water out of priority, which
resulted in injury to senior water rights.

A strict

application of existing laws would require that all of these
wells be shut down permanently.

However, the economic

ramifications of this potential solution created extraordinary
political pressure to resolve the problem without taking the
drastic step of shutting down the many unadministered and
unadjudicated wells.
The third development was the post-World War II
migration of people to Colorado's front range.

This demo

graphic shift created unprecedented demands for water for
municipal and industrial purposes.

Because existing water

supplies were largely held by the agricultural sector, farms
and ranches became the source of the water for this new

-9-

growth.

A market for water separate from the land arose, and

changes in use as well as changes in points of diversion
became common.

However, many of these changes were defacto

and without accommodation under existing law.

While courts

had previously made determinations on application of users as
to priority date and quantity of use, little attention had
been paid to the impact of changes in use on return flows.
New focus was given by engineers to the issues of consumptive
use, on farm efficiency, evapotranspiration losses and
transmissivity of aquifers, and water administration became a
highly technical art.
C.

Legislative Responses.

The legislative response to the discovery and
development of nontributary groundwater was two-fold.

First,

the legislature enacted H.B. 1066 in 1965 14/ to mandate the
regulation of wells in accordance with their priorities, and
second, it enacted a Ground Water Management Act 15/ which
created a nontechnical ground water commission to designate
nontributary ground water basins, approve establishment of
local management districts and regulate well permits for uses
within such basins.

This legislation mandated a level of

administration in law that was not possible in fact.

While an

integrated body of water in a stream can be allocated in
priority by opening and closing headgates, the low

14/

C.R.S. 1963, supp. § 148-11-22.

transmissivity rate of water in ground water aquifers makes it
impossible to allocate water in priority by regulation of
rates of well pumping.

Moreover, the time lag between ground

water withdrawal and stream impact may be so long that water
cannot be made available to meet stream calls by curtailing
diversions from wells.

The void between theory and fact

quickly created problems; the first attempt to curtail pumping
from particular wells was found to be arbitrary and capricious
in Fellhauer v. People 16/ as the Fellhauer well was senior to
other wells from the same aquifer that were not curtailed.
The Ground Water Management Act recognized that non
tributary waters may exist and that they should be adminis
tered on a basin-by-basin basis.

But, largely for political

reasons, no administrative machinery was put in place to
implement the mandates of the Act.

The State Engineer, to be

sure, was made an ex officio member of the Commission,17/ but
was given no regulatory authority.

Boundaries of aquifers

were set by application without reference to or knowledge of
actual hydrological conditions.

In fact, the definition of

designated groundwater included groundwater that was "not
adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein
groundwater withdrawals have constituted the principal water
usage for fifteen years preceding January 1, 1965."18/

16/

167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).

17/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-90-103(6).

18/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-90-103(6).
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When a

basin was designated, levels of historic division were given
priority regardless of aquifer limitations;19/ and new uses of
nontributary groundwaters outside of designated basins were
restricted to projections of the lifetime yield in and under
the land owned by or permitted to the user.20/
While the 1965 Act attempted to solve the problems
surrounding the use of nontributary groundwater,

the Act did

not address the other two developments identified above,

in

that it offered no solution for the problems created by the
tributary wells and the recently created need for changes in
existing decrees to accommodate new and different uses of the
water resource.

In response, the General Assembly in 1967 21/

directed the Director of the Division of Water Resources
(i)

to investigate relationships in areas where intermingled

surface and groundwater are used in conjunction with each
other for irrigation;

(ii) to employ such technical, legal and

practical assistance as may be reasonably required to deter
mine the need for and content of legislation that would pro
vide for integrated administration of all diversions and uses
of the water within the state;

(iii) to review existing water

laws to determine their sufficiency and the need for any modi
fications or supplementations thereto in order to provide an
effective system of administration; and (iv) to present a

19/

C.R.S, 1973 §§ 37-90-102, 37-90-106(1)(f ).

20/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-90-137(4).

21/

C.R.S. 1963 § 148-2-9.
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report, recommendations and proposed legislation to the 47th
General Assembly.

Public hearings were held, hydrological

studies of surface-groundwater relationships were completed by
consulting engineers and analyses of legislative needs and
proposed changes were made by private water attorneys.
Neither the State Engineer's office, the Attorney General's
office nor the Colorado Water Conservation Board were given
specific responsibilities.
Although consideration of administrative systems of
other states may have occurred in the course of the investiga
tions, the resulting report recommended, and the legislature
passed, an act 22/ which (i) preserved the judicial system for
determination of priorities;

(ii) extended that system to the

determination of hydrological issues raised by changes in
place and character of use;

(iii) changed the adjudication

process from periodic adjudications to a continous
adjudication process; and (iv) limited the State Engineer's
role essentially to administration of decrees and to a series
of administrative actions in connection with the granting of
well permits, approval of augmentation programs and
preparation of a tabulation of priorities that would all
require, with or without contest, an independent determination
in court.
In place of delegating authority to the State

22/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-101 et seq., known as the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969.
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Engineer to make determinations as to hydrological fact and
approve or disapprove applications of water users for changes
in point of diversion or place and character of use, the Act
(i) required all existing wells to be filed for adjudication
by the Water Court not later than July 1, 1972;23/
(ii) provided that a regimen of pumping that had continued for
18 years would be recognized in the tabulations ,24/ and
(iii) only allowed the state to participate in proceedings for
a change of the water right as an adversary or an applicant.
The 1969 Act, and subsequent amendments, did not
dispense with the need for both a well permit from the State
Engineer and a decree from the water court.25/

Thus, the

rights determined on application for a well permit are subject
to independent adjudication in the water court, and the water
right decreed may be different from that initially granted by
the State Engineer.
The legislative solution to the problem created by
the existing tributary wells was contained in the 1969 Act,
which recognized and allowed "plans for augmentation"26/;
alternate points of diversion at the wellhead for stream
priorities; and permitted the State Engineer to limit

23/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-306.

24/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-401(1)(b)(VI).

25/ See C.R.S. 1963 § 148-18-36(3); repealed in 1971 and
replaced by an amendment to what is now C.R.S. 1973
§ 37-90-132(2).

26/

C.R.S. 1973 §37-92-103(9).
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diversions by regulation to the extent required for protection
of vested rights in the basin.

Although the State Engineer

promulgated regulations, they had to be approved, if
contested, in the water court and essentially all the
determinations pertinent to the integration of well and
surface diversions were left to the costly, time-consuming and
inefficient procedures of the water court.
Finally, the evaluation of impacts resulting from
changes in use, which is essentially an analysis of
hydological and engineering factors, was relegated once more
to the water court.

No provisions were made for the exercise

of any state responsibility for protecting vested rights, or
for the use of the data base accumulated in the State
Engineer's office.

Accordingly, each water user continued to

have the responsibility to make technical investigations and
retain engineers and legal counsel to represent him on a
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continuing basis before the water court in order to protect
his "vested" right from injury.
D.

Nontributary Aquifers.

The 1969 Act, however, only pertained to constitu
tional appropriations,

i.e., to waters in aquifers hydrauli

cally connected to a natural stream.

Outside of the

recognized alluvial boundaries, groundwater areas could be
delineated and placed in a designated groundwater basin.
Several such basins were in fact designated on the high plains
in eastern Colorado and have been administered unchanged under
the management of the Ground Water Commission and the board of
directors of the appropriate management district.

No such

basins, however, were established on the western slope, in the
San Luis valley nor, most significantly,

in the broad Denver

basin extending along the front range from Colorado Springs to
Loveland.

By a 1973 amendment, well permits outside of a

designated basin were limited to the owner of the land or to
one with the authorization of the owner, and conferred an
almost absolute right to withdraw water within the boundaries
of the property at such a rate that the aquifer feeding the
well would not be exhausted for 100 years.30/
If the basins were nontributary to any stream system
in fact, and if the basin yield over a 100-year period could
be established with any reasonable level of predictability,

30/ This provision was commonly referred to as Senate Bill
213, and was codified at C.R.S. § 37-90-137(4).
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the theory behind the legislative regulation, being essen
tially the same as that established in designated basins, was
theoretically sound.
readily apparent.

The flaws in this approach, however, are

First, the right is adjudicated in the

water court on evidence of nontributary status and aquifer
characteristics presented in an adversary proceeding.

True,

the State Engineer is authorized to make that determination
but it cannot be made in fact on an ad hoc basis without first
determining the boundaries of an aquifer as a whole, the
recharge the aquifer may in fact have through faults from
surface or stream supplies and discharge by faults into a
river drainage system.

Second, once fixed by decree the right

is absolute and does not change with the hydrological data
that may be developed from other well logs and studies of
aquifer effects from aggregate pumping rates.

Third, the

decree limits the right to appropriate and divert available
water that might migrate, in consequence of withdrawals, from
tract to tract.
E.

The Huston Case.

In 1969 John Huston and others put the system at
issue by making appropriations of nontributary groundwater
throughout the state.

Adjudications of claims were mandated

under law on a tract-by-tract basis in the several water divi
sions and separate water courts.

The cases were consolidated

by order of the Supreme Court under a special water judge and
several key issues were stipulated for preliminary determina
tion by the Court.

Finally, in 1983, the Supreme Court

-17-

rendered a decision 31/ that nontributary waters were not
subject to adjudication prospectively in the water court
(although it recognized existing decrees), and provided that
such waters were subject to such prescriptions as the General
Assembly might provide.

The Governor responded with a

directive to the Director of Natural Resources to make a
thorough study of alternative administration systems for such
waters and make recommendations to an interim committee of the
General Assembly.32/

The studies were made, the report was

filed and the General Assembly once more enacted a band-aidtype statute in Senate Bill 5 in 1985.33/
F.

Senate Bill 5

Senate Bill 5 provided that (i) nontributary waters
shall not be subject to appropriation;

(ii) such waters shall

be allocated on the basis of ownership of overlying land;
(iii) augmentation to the stream system is required on a for
mula basis in all cases, with special provisions for the
various Denver aquifers; and (iv) the findings of the State
Engineer regarding well permit applications in the Denver
Basin aquifers only are reviewable in the water court pursuant
to modified provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
While this process continues the need for adjudi-

31/ State of Colorado v. Southwestern Colorado Water
Conservation District, 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983).
32

/

33/ Senate Bill 5 was signed into law bythe Governor on
June 6, 1985.
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cation of water rights by the water courts, and does not adopt
an administrative system for the allocation of water rights,
it does permit the State Engineer to prescribe, by regulation,
guidelines for definition of nontributary waters and
withdrawal limits.

The State Engineer is authorized to make

determinations as to augmentation requirements, to exercise
threshold discretion in granting well permits and make
extensions on good cause shown, and to determine rates of
withdrawal on the basis of a 100-year aquifer life for
specified Denver Basin formations.

He can also impose terms

and conditions for protection of vested rights and determine
the existence and extent of nontributary aquifers.
This increased participation by the state, acting
through the State Engineer, is a significant step by Colorado
towards meeting its fiduciary duty to administer water rights
in a coordinated and efficient manner.

Yet, once more, polit

ical self-interest has qualified the State Engineer's power in
ways that may increase water court litigation and lose the
administrative benefits prescribed by the Act.

In particular,

the Act (i) gives special treatment throughout to the Denver

-19-

Basin aquifers,34/ (ii) grants special rights to
municipalities who provide water service to overlying lands
and by ordinance create a presumption of consent that the
owner has allocated underground supplies to municipal use, and
(iii) allows the decisions of the State Engineer to be
reversed or modified by judicial review.

Moreover, with

respect to the Denver Basin aquifers, the Act specifically
limits the range in which administrative discretion can be
exercised, and requires an assumption that hydrostatic
pressures have been abated in calculating the impact of
withdrawals from such aquifers in the 100-year projections
made.
The Act also stops far short of addressing all of the
problems with the existing system for allocation and
administration of nontributary water rights.
(1)

Senate Bill 5:

raises constitutional questions by attempting to

subject admittedly tributary waters to allocation on the basis
of overlying land ownership.

This method of allocation

conflicts with the constitutional right to appropriate
tributary waters of the state;35/; (2) continues the
requirement that every groundwater right outside of a
designated groundwater basin go through a formal adjudication

34/ The Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, Laramie-Fox Hills and
Dakota aquifers are considered to be part of the Denver Basin.
35/ The Huston decision certainly did not provide a
foundation for excluding other than nontributary water from
the appropriation system.
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proceeding in the water court. These proceedings are in large
part duplicative of the factual investigations, evidentiary
proceedings and findings now required of the State Engineer,
and continues the present inefficient process of submitting,
in an adversarial setting, complex hydrological issues to a
non-technical decision maker;

(3) negates any appropriative

right to nontributary waters, implicitly confirms the
existence of a proprietary right and proceeds to limit such
right on an arbitrary and non-uniform basis throughout the
state;

(4) provides different appeal procedures for Denver

Basin administrative actions than for comparable actions in
other basins in the state;

(5) allows extension of well

permits only in the Denver Basin and thereby continues "use it
or lose it" conditions throughout the remainder of the state;
(6) permits aquifer status to be determined as of the date of
the permit, and assumes that this status continues
notwithstanding the fact that changes in the aquifer may
result from depletions caused by existing wells.

This

provision ultimately allows landowners who first acquire
permits to impair the correlative rights of neighbors;
(7) presumes consent by landowners to mine drainage programs
even though the effect of the mine drainage may be to deplete
groundwater resources under the owner's land without
compensation;

(8) allows municipal entities to take, without

showing the existence of an overriding public intent and
without the payment of just compensation, nontributary
groundwater which belongs to the overlying landowners; and

-21-

(9) constitutes special legislation for Denver Basin aquifers
which goes byond any privilege based on unique conditions,
e .g ., differing augmentation obligation and ceilings and
differing regulatory procedures.
In sum, Senate Bill 5 was a glaring exercise of
political self-interest, providing wholly superficial
protection to developers, municipalities, mining interests,
existing groundwater basins and management districts and a
broad class of persons with vested rights in the adjudication
system.

The legislature lost an opportunity given by the

Supreme Court in the Huston case to put in place a tested
program for regulation and use of the state's critical
groundwater resources.
III.

CRITIQUE OF SYSTEM.
Such is the Colorado system.

Does it meet the tests

prescribed for a sound system of administration?

It does

provide a vehicle for all the ministerial functions for all
kinds of water rights, i.e., it determines the existence,
point of diversion, and quantity and character of use in such
a form that the right can be administered.
A.

Need for Judicial Proceeding.

But is there any rational basis for continuing to
require these kinds of determinations to be made routinely in
costly judicial proceedings?

Perhaps more pertinent is the

question whether any need exists for requiring present and
potential holders of rights in a common source of supply to \
police the initiation and perfection of rights of other

-22-

appropriators.

Historically, prior to the 1969 Act, a

judicial proceeding may have had its place to establish
historic facts relating to the intent to appropriate, the time
when water was claimed, diverted and applied to beneficial
use, the appropriate quantity of flow appropriated and the use
to which it was put.

These were all evidentiary matters which

were susceptible to determination on the basis of nontechnical
findings of fact.

Moreover, since multiple rights were

adjudicated in the same proceeding, it was inevitable that
questions would arise as to the appropriate priority date.
But consider the changes wrought by the 1969 Act.
Under the new system, historical inquiries are limited by the
yearly adjudications.

The most important issues in the

adjudication of a water right are the determination of the
tributary or nontributary nature of the source of supply and
the need for augmentation of out of priority diversions.

Both

are technical or hydrological issues which can be determined
in the first instance by the State Engineer.
Where a conditional decree is first given, the appropriator must return from time to time to show diligence 36/ or
to establish that his right has become absolute.

The latter

issue is ministerial and could be determined by the filing of
a report with inspection by the water commissioner to show
compliance.

The former is the source of extensive contested

water court litigation, where decrees are continued from

36/

C.R.S. § 37-92-301(4).
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period to period on assertions of diligence and stipulations
with objectors.

The diligence standard in Colorado is far too

ephemeral and far too subject to distortion and abuse.

In

other states where rights arise by permit, the permit will
specify a time when work is to be completed or parts of work
are to be performed.

Where events of force majeure make it

impractical to meet permit deadlines, extensions can be
procured, with consideration for intervening rights of other
appropriators.

Determinations by the State Engineer can be

appealed to a court and judicial determinations made in those
cases where contests may exist.

Query whether any purpose is

served (i) by putting responsibility on individual water users
to challenge diligence in the first instance or, to avoid the
cost of trial, to stipulate for continuation of right on
specified conditions, or (ii) by requiring a judicial
proceeding, with notice and potential objections,

for merely

putting in decree format the claims of an applicant set out in
his application.

Significant court time could be saved and

costs to water users reduced if these matters could be found
administratively, with right of review for any person who
believes that an administrative decision is arbitrary or
capricious.
B.

Allocation Mechanics.

Consider next how effective the Colorado administra
tive system is in monitoring allocations of water in accor
dance with decreed priorities.

Division engineers and their

assistants (referred to as "water commissioners") make daily
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determinations of river flows at various measurement points,
determine the priority dates of appropriations that may take
water,37/ and regulate headgate diversions to meet downstream
calls.

Although they are charged with preventing waste of

water,38/ they have historically asserted no control over the
allocation and use of water below the headgate, and in fact do
not have acre-foot allocation figures in the decrees
administered (except where change proceedings have occurred)
to permit nonarbitrary regulation of use.
But in an age of growing water scarcity, this kind of
abstract regulation by dates and rates of flow is wholly
inadequate.

In arid regions there is a natural inclination to

divert, regardless of actual crop needs, the full amount of a
water right whenever it is available.

Statistics of aggregate

headgate diversions and acres of irrigated lands reveal a
variance in rates of water application, with some irrigators
using as much as six acre-feet per acre.

Although the waste

water may be returned to the stream through wasteways or
percolation to alluvial aquifers, the excess diversion may
delay the time when available water in the stream can be
delivered to headgates of downstream appropriators.
These inefficient uses of water can be prevented by
the implementation of a system which allows effective
monitoring of water diversions.

All ditches should be

37/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-501, 502.

38/

C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-502(2).
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required to file with the division engineer at the start of an
irrigation season the number of acres to be irrigated, the
calculated ditch and field losses that are reasonable for
application, the calculated consumptive use for the crops
grown and an estimate of the maximum water requirements
absence of precipitation)

for the ditch operation.

(in

Water

users could then be required to maintain timely records of
acre-foot diversions as well as second-foot rates of flow and
be required to report this information on a monthly basis to
the division engineer or water commissioner.

Where ditches,

on the basis of such reports, are using water at a higher rate
than requirements,

the appropriate water official should be

authorized to designate such ditches as critical, monitor uses
below the headgate,

impose penalties on the ditch, or give

notice to junior ditches to monitor excessive diversions.
Such a system would create consciousness of waste,

impose

reasonable management requirements on ditch administrations,
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and facilitate exercise of authority now vested in the
division engineers to conserve the available supplies.39/
Although the foregoing discussion focuses on ditch
diversions, the same kind of monitoring is now authorized and
is necessary for tributary wells, particularly where they are
subject to a limited pumping regime and powered by windmills
and gas engines not susceptible to withdrawal estimates.

In

both cases, penalties for erroneous reporting, or out-of
priority diverting, should be increased and summary action
should be available to administrators to assure proper
compliance.

39/ Legal support for increased regulation of waste is
inherent in existing water law: the right to appropriate
exists only for beneficial uses, which by definition excludes
waste.
The practical application of this concept has been
referred to in western water law as the "duty of water."
Reference to this concept can be found in the case law of many
states, and it referred to the presumption that a given amount
of water should be sufficient to irrigate a fixed amount of
land.
See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of
Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954); Taylor v. Tempe
Irrigatory Canal Company, 21 Ariz. 574, 193 P. 12 (1920);
California Pastoral and Agricultural Company, Ltd, v. The
Madera Council and Irrigation Company, 176 Cal. 78
(Calif. 1914);
Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State
Board of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (1978); State ex rel
Reynolds v. Mears, 86 N.M. 510, 525 P.2d 870 (1974). While
this restriction is not new, in Colorado it is only applied
when an appropriator seeks a change in point of use of water
right.
If, however, this concept were to be applied to all
diversions, regardless of whether they had been the subject of
a change application, excess diversions could be prevented.
This establishment of a duty of water, which would be
equivalent to the quantification of beneficial uses, should
logically be accomplished through a rulemaking by the State
Engineer.
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c.

Changes of U s e .

Consider next how effective the Colorado system is in
protecting existing rights from the effects of expanded uses
by others or alterations in stream flow resulting from the
many changes made in points of diversion and places and
character of use.

These matters are now committed to the

jurisdiction of the water court.

State Engineer participation

is limited to a report of the division engineer to the referee
or water judge unless the State files a statement of
opposition and thereby obtains party status.

Change

proceedings are typically contested and rest upon extensive
factual presentations or stipulations between applicant and
objectors with respect to acceptable terms and conditions.
The processing of these matters through the water
court has worked well, subject nonetheless to three signifi
cant shortcomings.

First, and most importantly,

the process

places the burden on the water right owner to keep apprised of
applications filed, to bear the cost of engineering evalua
tions necessary to determine the impact of a change upon his
particular water right and to bear the cost of appearing as an
objector, with legal representation,
his proof.

to put the applicant on

Second, the State Engineer does not have the

opportunity to employ the expertise of his office to get
facts, to evaluate potential impacts, to secure terms and
conditions to protect the river and to act in a parens patriae
capacity on behalf of the water users.

Finally, the very

nature of a judicial proceeding, with all of its provisions
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for discovery and other opportunities for delay, assures water
users that approval of a change cannot be expected in anything
short of one to two years.
It would seem that the commendable objectives of the
adjudication process could be achieved, without these short
comings, if the State Engineer were given jurisdiction in the
first instance to review applications, counsel with the appli
cant on desired terms and conditions to protect the river, and
enter a decision approving or rejecting the application.
Notice could be given of that determination, with a right of
review by applicant or objectors.

Where a hearing is held at

the administrative level with opportunity for objectors to
present evidence, review should be made on the administrative
record pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.

The

decision of the hearing officer should be overturned only if
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.

If an administra

tive decision is reached without an administrative record,
review should be de novo.
In brief, this change would eliminate the referees in
water court and substitute the State Engineer as the first
decision officer.

If one were to assume the worst, and all

decisions of the State Engineer were appealed, we would have a
no more costly or time-consuming exercise than we now have in
water court, but we would have the additional advantage of an
expert nonadversary hearing officer who would be capable of
using available river and aquifer data from a growing data
bank, and who would fashion a preliminary decree that would
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give the court a sounder basis for a decision than is
generated in the adversary arena.

But if the State Engineer

were to play an active and effective role in investigating and
evaluating proposals, and in the negotiation of protective
terms and conditions, substantial protection would be given to
water users without requiring their continual participation in
basinwide water court proceedings.
The adoption of this system would,

in all likelihood,

result in more efficient allocation and administration of
Colorado water resources.

The owners of vested water rights

would be freed from the costly burden of monitoring all appli
cations for water rights and change of water rights, and the
existing system would be streamlined so as to eliminate
unnecessary duplication and the attendant expense and delay.
D.

Need for Uniformity.

To the extent the General Assembly has used band-aid
approaches to deal with special problems that have arisen in
administration,

it has lost the objectivity which is only

available by a coordinated approach.

For instance,

in the

Ground Water Management Act of 1965, a nontechnical commission
was established to make policy decisions with respect to
boundaries of designated basins, the creation of management
districts, the measurement of aquifer life, determination of
rate of development and the like.

It placed the State

Engineer on the commission but gave him no administrative
authority.

Its decisions as well as the State Engineer's

decisions are reviewable by the District Court in the judicial
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district where the land lies, not by the water court.

In

contrast, when Senate Bill 5 was enacted this year for
nontributary groundwaters outside designated basins, policy
was fixed by the legislature, special rules were enacted for
the Denver Basin and no jurisdiction was given to the ground
water commission.

Appeals from State Engineer decisions

pertaining to the Denver Basin would go to the water court
under modified provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act;
other appeals would go to the District Courts as before.
This seemingly illogical delegation of authority and
responsibility creates needless confusion.
one case should be right in others.

What is right in

If policy can be made by

a commission, rather than by the State Engineer, it should be
made uniformly.

There frankly is no need for compartmentaliz

ing water resources for separate administration and inconsis
tent rules.

Diversity continues to exist because special

interest groups and certain self-serving legislative represen
tatives have approached each issue with the intent to obtain
an advantage for a particular group of water users..

The time

has come for water administration to be viewed as a whole,
decision authority to be centralized and administrative
procedures to be compatible for all variations in water
sources.
IV.

OTHER STATE PATTERNS.
Without detailing the laws of each of our sister

states, I will describe four patterns of administration that
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Colorado could well investigate.
A.

The Preliminary Decree.

First is the use of a preliminary decree.
system, an application is made

Under this

o the responsible agency.

A

preliminary decree is then fashioned on the basis of informa
tion in the application, a report from the agency charged with
analyzing all applications for decrees,40/ and applicable laws
and compacts and other information the decision officer may
collect.

The decision is then served on interested parties or

published in a form adequate to assure notice to all who might
perceive they would be affected.

If no objections are filed,

the preliminary decree becomes final and is recorded;

if an

objection is filed, the objector must state specific grounds
and evidence on which error is claimed.

A hearing is then

held either in the department or in court and, following such
hearing, a final decree is entered.
If a judicial proceeding is required in order to join
and bind the United States under the McCarren Act,41/ the
action can be initiated in court, referred to the hearing
officer, and then the preliminary decree can be entered by the
court.

Montana, with a permit system for initiation of water

40/ Public confidence in any administrative system requires
that there be adequate, if not total, separation between the
hearing officer and the agency which purports to provide an
objective analysis of the proposed application.
This could
easily be accomplished by creating separate divisions within
the agency to perform each function.
..
41/

43 U.S.C. § 666.
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rights and historic practices of nonjudicial adjudication and
administration, went to a judicial system in 1979 to permit
compacts with Indian tribes and federal water rights to be
adjudicated.42/

It did so in a form preserving the benefits

of its historic administrative system.

It confined eviden

tiary proceedings to objections made to carefully sculpted
preliminary decrees.

Since we have water courts already

established, Colorado could utilize such a system, by requir
ing applications to be filed with the water court, which would
then be referred to the State Engineer.

A report would then

be prepared regarding relevant hydrological considerations
with data drawn from an ongoing data bank.

The State Engineer

would then prepare a preliminary decree which would be filed
with the water judge and published and distributed in the same
manner applications are now published and distributed.

The

water court could confine evidentiary proceedings to
objections to the preliminary decree.

The system would avoid

routine litigation and duplication of hearings before the
administrator and the court.

42/

R.C.M. 1983 § 85-2-211 et seq.
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B.

Change Application Processing.

Procedures are fairly Uniform in appropriation states
with respect to the investigation and processing of change
applications.

The McCarren Act does not waive sovereign

immunity in such proceedings so it is unnecessary to use a
court proceeding for jurisdictional purposes.

Even where

court proceedings may be employed in adjudication of priori
ties,' the designated water official exercises complete juris
diction over such changes.

He reviews the application and, if

change can be made without impairment of existing rights, the
change is approved.

If the state water official perceives

there might be injury to others from the proposed change,
notice is served personally or by publication so that
interested parties may appear and participate.

The state

officer then makes a decision on the basis of an administra
tive record, including his evaluation and report and any evi
dence introduced by parties who appeared as the result of the
published notice.

His decision is final unless the applicant

or objectors elect to appeal.

If so, the trial court will

take up the record as evidence subject to objections, allow
additional evidence to be taken, give weight to the water
officer's decision, thereby putting the burden on the objector
to overturn, and render a final determination.
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With that type

of system in New Mexico,43/ Utah 44/ and Wyoming,45/ the state
administrator is given broad authority to promulgate rules and
guidelines for the conduct of proceedings and the administra
tion of priorities.
Such an approach would eliminate the most serious of
Colorado's problems.

It would permit the State Engineer to

use the hydrological data bank as a foundation for analysis of
injury, and would allow active participation by the State
Engineer in negotiations between the applicant and objectors
in an effort to protect existing rights.

Moreover, it puts

the State Engineer in a parens patriae position with
responsibility for protecting the regimen of existing uses,
yet gives any party an opportunity for an independent judicial
hearing if aggrieved by arbitrary or unjust administrative
action.46/
C.

Groundwater Regimen.

The pattern developed in all states with identifiable
groundwater reservoirs with limited rechargeability is four
pronged.

First, groundwater permitting and adjudication is

43/

Section 72-7-1 N.M.S.A. 1978.

44/

U.C.A. 1953 § 73-3-14 (Repl. Vol. 7C, 1980).

45/

W.S. 1977 § 41-4-401.

46/ One facet of the Montana statute that has appeal is the
assessment of attorneys' fees against the losing party on
appeal, if appeal is taken from an administrative order or
preliminary decree.
See R.C.M. 1983 § 85-2-125.
Such a
provision should make the administrator more sensitive to the
defensibility of his decision and the objector a bit more
cautious about appealing a decision.
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integrated into the general water management institution, and
procedures for acquiring groundwater rights are frequently the
same as for surface rights.

Second, where diversions exceed

recharge to an aquifer, the aquifer is designated to be
critical, and new rights are limited to the quantity of
recharge or augmentation provided.

Third, local management is

permitted over such aquifers to encourage conservation of
water, exploration and development of recharge opportunities
and control changes of beneficial use.

However, even where

local management and control exist, the State Engineer polices
withdrawals under statutes,
orders.

Finally,

regulations and administrative

judicial review is generally limited to the

standards of review provided by the Administrative Procedure
Act.

Colorado should take a hard look at the Arizona

A c t .47/

This approach was rejected by a majority of the

Governor's interim study group on the grounds that the act has
not solved all of Arizona's problems.

But that approach would

go far in avoiding the definitional issues raised by S.B. 5,
provide uniformity of administration, define critical aquifers
and permit drawdown and usage of each aquifer to be tailored
to the characteristics of the aquifer.
D.

Conservation and Elimination of W a s t e .

Finally, the statutes of Utah,48/ Wyoming,49/ New

47/

A.R.S. § 45-401 through § 45-637.

48/

U.S.A. 1953 § 73-5-9 (Repl. Vol. 7C, 1980)

49/

W.S. 1977 § 41-3-603/
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Mexico,50/ Washington 51/ and California 52/ confer broad
powers on the water officials to take affirmative action to
conserve water and eliminate waste in the application of water
to beneficial use.

Some states permit the appointment of

water masters in limited areas and confer powers on engineers
and water masters to get expedited relief in the form of
injunctions and assessments of penalties from the courts.
While Colorado has expressed concern about water shortages,
nonbeneficial usage of water and speculative activities, the
General Assembly has refused to take the steps necessary to
solve these problems.

The General Assembly should define and

enforce forfeiture of water rights for nonuse, grant authority
to water officials to define and prevent waste and establish
substantial penalties for violation of administrative or
judicial orders.

50/

[Section 72-13-8 N.M.S.A. 1978]

51/

R.C.W. §§ 90.03.005, 90.44.110.

52/

Wests Ann. Cal. Water Code §§ 100, 275, 300-311.
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V.

RECOMMENDATION.
All of the above-described procedures are preferable

in my judgment to the existing Colorado procedure, not only
from the viewpoint of the water user but more broadly from the
viewpoint of the public.

But in light of the self interest

that maintains the existing archaic system,

I see no

likelihood that the present General Assembly will make any
significant change in present procedures.

I have been hard

pressed to find a rational explanation for the anti-State
Engineer syndrome that seems to be peculiar to this state.
The General Assembly has neither authorized nor funded that
office to perform adequately the services which it is capable
of providing to the water users of the state.

As previously

discussed, the State Engineer can make priority determinations
and provide records for administration of priorities without
need for complex judicial proceedings, with a right of appeal
under the Administrative Procedure Act for those who feel that
the agency has been arbitrary or capricious.

He can protect

the regimen of use on the river for the benefit of all water
users and can monitor allocations to avoid or at least
minimize waste.

But far beyond those administrative roles,

his office can facilitate decision-making by developing a data
bank for each of the rivers and aquifers, use such data for
evaluation of applications for change, needs for augmentation
and effects of exchange and provide nonadversarial data for
decision-making at minimal cost to water users.

With such

data, that office can further facilitate changes in water use
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by counseling proponents on impacts of proposed actions and
alternatives to achieve their goal.

It can conduct continuing

studies of nontributary aquifers and, with authority, enlarge
or control diversion rates and augmentation requirements to
achieve conservation objectives.

However, all of these

functions require trained personnel and adequate technical
support, which has not been forthcoming from the General
Assembly.
Unfortunately, the General Assembly is not the only
barrier to change.

This state started on a court adjudicatory

system in part by chance but initially of justifiable neces
sity when records of appropriations were not otherwise avail
able for administration.

By the time that system came up for

review in 1968-69, we had an entrenched legal and engineering
fraternity that was dependent on the continuation of a
judicial system of adjudication.

Members of the water bar and

engineering group had significant partisan roles in reviewing
existing law and recommending revisions.

The validity of this

analysis is certainly confirmed by the fact that almost every
change that has been recommended and adopted by the General
Assembly has enlarged the judicial role, increased the cost of
decision-making and increased the volume and complexity of the
legal and hydrological determination which must be made in
conjunction with the acquisition or change of a water right.
A change can occur only if a nonpartisan body makes a compara
tive study of practices in other adjudication states in the
west and in the eastern states that have converted to an
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appropriation system in recent years, and from such study
measure:

(i) the success of the comparative systems by the

volume of water litigation that is generated;

(ii) the cost to

water users of protecting the regimen of the river and their
historic uses;

(iii) the time required for decision-making;

and (iv) the extent to which conservation of water resources
and elimination of waste are recognized as management objec
tives.

What I therefore recommend is that a nonpolitical

research organization be encouraged to prepare a white paper
on water administration which addresses, from an analytical
and political perspective,

the administrative systems in our

sister appropriation states.
I have no doubt that such a study will demonstrate
that an administrative nonjudicial system will be more effec
tive, less costly, less time-consuming and less susceptible to
court-oriented disputes.

Once such a white paper is prepared,

and any proposal for change is carefully tied to protection of
vested rights, I suspect a wide level of support will be found
in the League of Women Voters, the American Water Resources
Association, the Colorado Water Congress and similar groups.
Once user support is generated, the fears of change will
evaporate and pressure will be asserted for legislative
action.
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